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The evolution of a field of law may be measured by its legal
literature. In 1966, Sovern published the first modern text in the field
of equal employment opportunity law,I which addressed Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 It was brief and general because there
was little case law. By 1976, there were 14 volumes of fair employment practice cases. In that year, Schlei and Grossman published
their text, Employment DiscriminationLaw. 3 This was a thoughtfully organized book which included verbatim extracts of virtually all
of the important cases which had been decided up to that time.
The short five years since then has produced another 10 volumes
of cases. The number of Supreme Court decisions has increased and
the number of new "legal issues" has expanded. It is becoming impossible to reproduce the important cases in a text.
In response to this expansion of the law, Zimmer, Sullivan and
Richards have sought to move the legal literature into a new phase.
Their text is based on the premise that the field can best be mastered
by an analytical approach which encompasses the case law and other
developments, rather than by reproducing parts of the major opinions. It includes lucid introductions to statistics and psychology, two
disciplines which have extensive applications in equal employment
law. 4 The text concludes with a careful examination of the processes
of conciliation which Congress intended to be the centerpiece of Title
VII enforcement. 5 The authors are among the few to make Title VII
negotiation the subject of formal legal analysis. Their efforts to encourage systematic thinking about the conciliation process under Title
VII are to be applauded.

I M. SovaRN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1966), reviewed by this reviewer, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 721 (1967).
I Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1964)).
2 B. SCHLE AND P. GROSSMAN,
reviewer, 1977 DUKE L.J. 279.

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

(1976), reviewed by this

4 C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMEt & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION, chs. 1.8, 2.2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOY-

MENT DISCRIMINATION].

5 Id. ch. 14. See also A. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW, ch. 2 (1971).

1981]

BOOK REVIEW

The book contains a good balance between abstract theory of
Title VII law and practical material relating to some of the more
interesting procedural, class action, and discovery problems., It is
well worth having at hand for both scholarly and practical purposes.
The authors are exactly on target in identifying basic theoretical
questions which must trouble lawyers, judges, and students. They are
perceptive in identifying the complexities in the various theories of
discrimination under Title VII. In addition, they are candid about the
policies which underly their analysis. They believe in the principles of
the equal employment opportunity law, are skeptical about "countervailing" considerations, and would give the law a broad interpretation. They believe that race and sex consciousness is necessary in
certain situations to "remedy past societal discrimination."1 7 The
remainder of this review expresses reservations about some of their
conclusions, but not about their underlying policy perspective.
I.

DISPARATE IMPACT AND DISPARATE TREATMENT

The Supreme Court has identified two theories of Title VII discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate impact. The disparate
impact of a neutral employment practice is illegal regardless of intent,
in the absence of business necessity. 8 Disparate treatment is evidence
of discriminatory intent, purpose, or motive. The authors believe that
the disparate treatment concept is the broader of the two, and that
"disparate impact" may prove disparate treatment.9 There is a vast
difference between the two theories. A showing of adverse impact
shifts the burden of proof of business necessity to the employer, 0
while a showing of discriminatory purpose shifts only the burden of
going forward with evidence of a legitimate business." The authors
are wrong in concluding that the purpose or intent theory is as broad
as the "impact" approach. Their effort to "merge" the two theories
leads to another error.
The Supreme Court has articulated a legal standard or norm
against which to evaluate the employers' practices. The key statement, quoted by the authors, is:

6 FEDEiAL STATUTORY

LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCIUMINATION, supra note 4, chs. 3, 6, 7.
Id. at vi.
8 Id. ch. 1.
8 Id. at 20.
10 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
7

" Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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Absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondis-

criminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force
more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of
the population of the community from which employees are
hired. 12
This is an important normative statement. It expresses the court's
view of what ought to happen under the statute. It is not a "prediction" in terms of probabilities. It is certainly not rooted in history. A
non-discriminatory society might be one in which members of various
groups tend to concentrate in different occupations. Our patterns of
employment, however, have resulted from slavery and cultural subordination, and the statutory goal of a non-discriminatory society makes
this a proper legal standard against which to measure an employer's
conduct. This general standard illuminates the proof required under
either the "impact" or the intent theory. The Supreme Court has
adopted a "two or three standard deviation" test for proof of intentional discrimination. The authors assume that this standard is also
applicable to proof of disparate impact. 13 This is not the case. The
standard deviation approach is appropriate to prove illegal purpose
because it eliminates the likelihood that the differences occurred by
chance. But the adverse impact standard is less rigorous. It describes
situations in which an employer ought to justify its practices on business necessity grounds, regardless of intent.
The authors express a fondness for "sophisticated" statistical techniques for identifying "adverse impact." They are critical of the relatively simple "80 percent" or "4/5" rule of the Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures (hereinafter referred to as UGESP) .14
This "rule of thumb" compares the ratio of hirings or promotions of
white/males with that of minorities/females. "Adverse impact" exists
if the ratio of hirings of minorities or women is less than 80 percent of
the ratio for white males. The discussion of the "sophisticated" statistical techniques is informative. But I wonder if these techniques are
"sophisticated," or only complicated? Do we not run the risk of losing
the forest of race and sex discrimination midst the trees of statistics?
The authors correctly note that the method of identifying "adverse impact" is the "intuitive judgment" of the courts.15 I think the
12 FEDRAL STATuTonY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 4, at 22 (quoting

International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1977)).
13 Id.

14 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1978). FEDERAL STATuToRY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCaIMINATION,
supra note 4, at 48-51.
Is FEDERAL STATuTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 4, at 14.
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law should stay that way. "Statistical significance" may be one way to
prove discriminatory purpose because it virtually eliminates chance,
but it is unnecessary and unduly burdensome and complex when
applied to the "adverse impact" standard. That standard must be
sufficiently simple to be applied by employers in the administration of
their own employment systems. We cannot expect each employer to
have a statistician at hand, but we can expect them to be able to do
simple formulas. This is the functional value of the UGESP "4/5" or
"80 percent" rule. It can be applied by employers alone, and by
government officials "on the scene" without the counsel of statisticians. The authors nod only briefly toward these realities.' 6
II. THE BorroM LINE
The authors are critical of the "bottom line" principle, which
measures adverse impact by the "overall result" of the employer's
hiring practice, rather than by the "impact" of each component of
that process. If the overall process for a job does not have an adverse
impact, the "bottom line" theory would disregard the adverse impact
of particular components. 17 This theory permits an employer whose
system has a component with adverse impact to "cancel out" that
impact by hiring or promoting appropriate numbers of minorities or
women from among those deemed qualified. If the objective of the
law is to improve employment opportunities of minorities and
women, and an employer acts in such a way as to further that objective, the law should not trouble that employer in the absence of
deliberate discrimination. What is the social gain in viewing each
segment of the employer's practices separately? Is it to avoid the
possibility of evasion of Title VII liability? If so, that can be dealt with
severely in any subsequent proceeding. Is it to benefit a particular
member or members of the minority/female group as compared with
other such persons? Equitable claims of particular women or minorities as against other minorities or women normally cannot be resolved
on equal employment opportunity grounds. 8 Other equitable conId. at 50. I participated in the development of the UCESP, a fact which may influence my
view of the issue. See Blumrosen, The Bottom Line in Equal Employment Guidelines;Administering a PolycentricProblem, 33 AD. L. R v. 323 (1981), for a discussion of the process by which

the principle was developed.
17 See Blumrosen, The Bottom Line Concept in Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 12
N.C. CErNT. L.J. 1 (1980).
IS This is subject to the qualification that victims of the employer's prior "discrimination"
must be made whole. But the "bottom line" theory holds that where the employer has "cancelled
out" adverse impact, there is no "discrimination" in that process and there are no "victims." The

employer's prior and separate discrimination, of course, is not "cancelled out" by its subsequent
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siderations must be invoked. Title VII does not seek to single out the
"'most worthy" among minorities or women and require the
employer
to benefit them.
In Teal v. Connecticut,19 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit rejected the "bottom line" concept in a manner which suggests
a concern for the "equities" of certain black workers. Black plaintiffs
had been doing the work for up to two years when they failed a
written test. They were to be replaced by blacks who had not done the
work, but had passed the test. The court held that the test was illegal
because it screened out a higher proportion of blacks than of whites
despite the fact that the employer had hired a higher percentage of
black than of white applicants. One can certainly be skeptical about a
civil service system which uses written tests rather than performance
evaluations in considering persons for promotion. But the black plaintiffs in Teal were in precisely the position of thousands of civil service
workers who have had temporary assignments but who have not
received promotions. As long as the employer hired an appropriate
percentage of blacks into the jobs in question, Title VII should not be
used to correct judicially perceived infirmities in the civil service
system.
The authors contend that the "bottom line" approach is inconsistent with Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 20 and Dothard v. Rowlinson,2 1
and "allows discriminatory practices to be insulated from judicial
scrutiny."'2 2 This statement assumes the point at issue: whether, as a
matter of policy, an employer should be held to have discriminated
when it meets the "bottom line" standard.
The authors argue that Dothard and Griggs, "focus on the components of the selection process that plaintiffs challenged without
reference to any overall impact of the selection process."'2 3 This is not
true. Griggsaddressed practices which, "operate to disqualify Negroes
at a substantially higher rate than white applicants. '2 4 Dothard not
only quotes Griggs, but states "a plaintiff need only show that the
facially neutral standards in question select applicants for hire in a
significantly discriminatory pattern. ' 25 Both cases dealt with pracacts. Thus, if an employer has discriminatorily assigned blacks to certain jobs, its later hiring of
other blacks to "white" jobs will not reduce its liability for the initial discrimination.
"0645 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1981).
-o 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
,I 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
2 FEDERAL STATUTOrY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCIuMINATION, supra note 4, at 51.
at 49.
" 401 U.S. at 426.
23 Id.

433 U.S. at 329.
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tices which "operate to exclude Negroes"26 (Griggs) or "work in fact
disproportionately to exclude women from eligibility for employment"2 7 (Dothard). Neither Griggs nor Dothardinvolved an advisory
opinion on a component of a selection process which did not harm
minorities or women. Both were rooted in the realities of economic
harm to the plaintiff class.
I believe the "bottom line" is a necessary concept to implement
the principles of Title VII because it tells employers that there is "light
at the end of the tunnel." Without this, the incentive to take affirmative action is reduced.
III.

AFFIRMATIvE ACTION: FORMAL AND INFORMAL

The authors develop an interesting distinction between United
Steelworkers v. Weber2 8 and McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. 2 1 Weber approved an organized affirmative action plan in
which fifty-percent of spaces in a training program were reserved for
blacks. Santa Fe Trail disapproved "ad hoc" affirmative action in
which the employer discharged two whites who engaged in theft, but
not their black associate. The authors seem prepared to accept this
distinction as consistent with the principles of Title VII. I am not.
In the workaday world, much "affirmative action" will end up
appearing to be "ad hoc." Affirmative action plans for hiring or
promoting percentages of minorities or women ultimately are reflected in individual hiring or promotion decisions. These decisions
often involve weighing the merits of competing candidates. When an
employer makes such a judgment, it will appear to be an "ad hoc"
determination. Thus, the distinction between formal and "ad hoc"
affirmative action may break down in operation. But beyond that, the
distinction fails to take account of the objective of the statute to
improve employment opportunities of minorities and women, particularly in job situations from which they have been restricted. If an
employer has reason to contribute to this effort, and selects minority
or female applicants from the pool of qualified applicants, it should
have the benefit of this statutory purpose if sued for "reverse discrimination." The law should not restrict the right to take affirmative
action to those employers who are organized in a bureaucratic man30
ner.
26 401 U.S. at 431.

7 433 U.S. at 329.
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
u 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
3 The authors' view is apparently that of the Seventh Circuit in Lehman v. Yellow Freight
Sys., Inc., 651 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1981). That case invalidated informal affirmative action on
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Santa Fe Trail is not a "reverse discrimination" case. The "reverse discrimination" issue arises only when minorities/women and
whites/males compete for scarce opportunities and the employer favors the minority or female. Santa Fe Trail did not involve that
situation. The black and whites were not in competition. The whites
did not want the employer to discharge the black, in order to hire
irrelevant to the "reverse discrimthem. Thus Santa Fe Trail is simply
3
ination-affirmative action" issue. '
It is time to develop the elements of a "reverse discrimination"
case, consistently with the principles of Title VII.32 However, the
authors' distinction between "formal" and "ad hoc" affirmative action
is not a useful method of implementing the statutory policy.
IV.

GRIGGS AND THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

The authors believe that the purposes of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (hereinafter referred to as ADEA) 33 are furthered
by applying the "disparate impact" theory. This is a fundamental
mistake for two reasons. First, it is not what Congress intended. The
report of the Secretary of Labor on which the ADEA is based distinguishes between the use of specific age limits on hiring and termination based on stereotypes about older workers, and practices which
"bear more strongly on older workers" than on younger ones. 34 The
former were to be made illegal; the latter were not to be made illegal
but were to be addressed by a variety of other programs.
Secondly, the prime beneficiaries of the ADEA are white males
in their fifties and sixties. They are also the beneficiaries of traditional
discrimination against minorities and women. To give them the bene-

grounds I consider "speculative." The other circuits which have passed on the matter have
upheld the bottom line approach. EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, 124 F.E.P. 7 (3d Cir. 1980);
Hameed v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local Union
No. 396, 24 F.E.P. 352 (8th Cir. 1980); Rice v. City of St. Louis, 607 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1979);
Blizard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Navajo Refining Co., 593 F.2d 988
(9th Cir. 1979); Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978); Hernandez v. Phelps Dodge
Refining Co., 572 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1978); Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976).
31 This was noted by the Court itself. 427 U.S. at 280-81 n.8.
32 See Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 325 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1981).
- 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
34 SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE OLDRi AMERICAN WoIRKERs-AcE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1965). The authors' view is shared by the Second Circuit, Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d
1027 (1981), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 2028 (1981), but is apparently not shared by other circuits.
See Kephart v. Institute of Gas Tech., 630 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730,736 (5th Cir. 1977); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th
Cir. 1975).
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fit of the Griggs principle will inevitably slow the process of affirmative action for minorities and women.
The authors, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 35 apparently do not see this as a problem. But it is an inevitable
and important element in the decision as to whether the "Griggs
Principle" is applicable to the ADEA. In my view, the Congressional
purpose of the ADEA can be accomplished without the "adverse
impact test." The use of the "impact test" creates quixotic results in
the ADEA which are not present in Title VII cases. It might invalidate practice which favors many older workers, such as promotion
from within and "step" increases based on longevity.
CONCLUSION

The authors correctly identified the need for a text which attempts a synthesis of Title VII law. They have undertaken this task in
the spirit of support for the policies of equal employment opportunity.
They have made a thought provoking and sensitive analysis. My
disagreements with some of their conclusions does not detract from
my admiration for the thorough and comprehensive quality of their
effort.
Alfred W. Blumrosen*

3 Proposed Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 68858 (Nov. 30, 1979).
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